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ABSTRACT   
Initially, free software communities are characterized by self-
management, however, they were also influenced by public and 
private organizations that identified potential gains in the use of 
the geographically distributed production model. In this context, 
this research aims to answer the following questions: Do sponsors 
influence the organizational structures of free software 
communities by promoting differences between sponsored and 
non-sponsored communities? What strategies are adopted by the 
sponsor to influence the organizational structure of free software 
communities? Two constructs are central to the study: 
organizational structure and sponsorship. For this research, we 
adopted case study methodology and three free software 
communities were studied. In the analysis of the results it was 
evidenced that sponsors influence decision making, definition of 
community key roles, and a formalization of norms. In turn, non-
sponsored communities were characterized by the centralization 
and informality of the norms. We conclude that differences were 
identified in the organizational structure of sponsored and non-
sponsored free software communities, and this differentiation was 
influenced by sponsors. In addition, it was possible to describe 
strategies and mechanisms used by sponsors to influence the 
community organizational structure. 
CCS Concepts 
Software and its engineering →  Software creation and 
management →  Collaboration in software development →  
Open source model 
Keywords 
Free Software Communities; Organizational Structure; 
Sponsorship 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Virtual communities as types of organization are influenced by 
groups which they maintain relationships (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). The relevance of each of these groups is related to their  
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capability to influence the organization's objectives (Mitchell et 
al., 1997). The sponsors are key players in understanding for 
virtual communities, because they have essential resources to 
maintain the organization (Hillman et al., 2009). 
Examples of virtual communities are communities of practice, 
consumer communities, activist communities, and software 
communities (Kozinets, 1999; Brown & Deguid, 2001; O'Mahony 
& Ferraro, 2007; Lee, 2008). Free software communities stand out 
in this group, especially because their level of sophistication in 
governance and collaborative work (O’Mahony, 2001; West & 
O’Mahony, 2005; O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007; O’Mahony, 2007). 
A free software can be executed, adapted, redistributed, and 
refined by users (Hill et al., 2007). Initially, free software 
communities were characterized by self-management. Currently, 
they were also influenced by public and private organizations that 
identified potential gains in using the collaborative and 
geographically distributed production model (Fitzgerald, 2006; 
O’Mahony, 2007). (Riehle & Berschneider, 2012). 
In this sense, the studies began to investigate the influence of 
sponsoring organizations on the organizational structure of free 
software communities (O’Mahony, 2007). There is evidence that 
sponsors of software communities are responsible for strategic 
decisions (Stuemer, 2009), division of tasks (van Wendel de 
Joode, 2004, Wijnen-Meijer & Batenburg, 2007) and the 
formalization of norms (Lakhani & Wolf, 2005; Blekh, 2015), 
contrasting with the philosophy of independence and collaborative 
management that characterized the early software communities 
(Raymond, 1998). 
In this context, our research aims to answer the following 
questions: Do sponsors influence the organizational structures of 
free software communities, promoting differences between 
sponsored and non-sponsored communities? What strategies are 
adopted by the sponsor to influence the organizational structure of 
free software communities? This study presented strategies and 
mechanisms used by sponsors in interventions in the free software 
communities, as well showed organizational differences between 
sponsored and non-sponsored communities. The clarification of 
this relationship allows to understanding the phenomenon of 
expansion of sponsored free software communities (West & 
O’Mahony, 2005, Stuermer et al., 2009, Androutsellis-Theotokis 
et al., Nielsen et al., 2003). 
2. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
There are many definition to organizational structure, but in 
general is defined as a form of coordination and control through 
administrative mechanisms, in order to integrate organizational 
units that perform different activities (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; 
Jackson & Morgan, 1982). The coordination and control of the 
organizational activities are operationalized by hierarchical levels, 
mechanisms of integration between the areas, distribution of roles 
and responsibilities, and the formalization of norms. (Thompson, 
1967; Walton, 1986; Sablynski, 2012). From the definitions of 
organizational structure established above, we characterized 
structure based on three characteristics: centralization of decision-
making, division of labor and specialization, and formalization of 
the organization's procedures (Hall, 1967; Zheng, et al., 2010; 
Mafini, 2014; Ho et al.; 2014; Jorge & Carvalho, 2014; Foss et al. 
2014; Lin, 2012; Worley & Doyle, 2015; Gibson et al., 2015). 
Centralization is related to the concentration of authority in 
decision making in one person, department, or hierarchical level 
(Galbraith, 1974; Ferell & Skinner, 1988; Jensen & Meckling, 
1992; Schminke et al., 2002). For Simon (1977), identifying a 
management of decision-making is essential to understand the 
organization. An organization with a high degree of 
decentralization, authority is delegated to all levels and employees 
are free to perform their duties in the way they consider most 
productive (Andrews et al., 2008). Otherwise, a high degree of 
centralization or top-down control, when there is concentration of 
authority in a higher instance in the organization (Andrews et al., 
2008). In literature, opposite results have been reported. Some 
authors have found positive results with centralization (Ruekert et 
al., 1985) and others have obtained better results with 
decentralization (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Dewar & Werbel, 1979; 
Chen & Huang, 2007). Centralization facilitates performance 
control, making it more predictable (Germain et al., 2008). On the 
other hand, it has several disadvantages cited in the literature, 
such as difficulty in maintaining communication, commitment and 
employee involvement (Chen & Huang, 2007). On the other hand, 
decentralization favors the exploitation of market opportunities, 
since work processes are more flexible and adaptable, as well as 
favor the communication and perception of employees of a good 
work environment (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Dewar & Werbel, 
1979; Armandi & Mills, 1982; Stuart & Podolny, 1996; Schminke 
et al., 2002; Smith & Tushman, 2005; Tran & Tian, 2013).  
The division of labor is a distribution of activities in an 
organization, being influenced by the differentiation of the tasks 
and the specialization of the areas (Kahn et al., 1964), or a 
consequence of the organization's growth (Blau, 1970). There is 
controversy over the impact of organizational size on the 
differentiation of structures, and some studies have pointed to this 
relationship as irrelevant (Hall et al., 1967). The literature on 
organizational theories highlights this trade-off between 
departmentalization and coordination costs. In other words, more 
specialization and differentiation implies higher costs of 
coordination (Blau, 1970; Weber, 2004). Therefore, one of the 
consequences of the differentiation of structures is the increase of 
the administrative component of organizations, areas specialized 
in managing the interdependence of the work of other sectors 
(Blau, 1970). In addition, the division of labor is a rational 
positioning of the organization against a heterogeneous task 
environment, seeking in this context to identify homogeneous 
segments and establish units in the organizational structure to deal 
with each specific segment (Thompson, 1967).  
Finally, formalization is the evaluation of the use of rules and 
procedures to guide users' behaviors and the decision-making 
process in the organization (Zheng et al., 2010). In addition, 
formalization indicates how much of the principles, policies, 
procedures, and rules for managing firm processes are formally 
registered (Lee & Choi, 2003; Pertusa-Ortega et al., 2010). When 
an organization has a high degree of formalization, an execution 
of business processes is well described and written (Willem & 
Buelens, 2009). There are divergences in the literature about the 
effects of formalization. For some authors, organizations with a 
high degree of formalization constrain the spontaneity and 
flexibility necessary to improve communication and internal 
interaction (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Chen & Huang, 2007), 
while others demonstrate that formalized organizational structures 
contribute to the organizational effectiveness (Wang, 2003). For 
instance, formalization allows members of the organization to 
understand the productive flow within the company, thus 
facilitating member cooperation, collaboration, trust (Schminke et 
al., 2002; Jansen et al., 2006), decision making and 
communications (Ferrell & Skinner, 1988; Nahm et al., 2003). 
3. SPONSORSHIP 
The proposals under discussion are related to the sponsor, a 
specific player who invests resources in the development of the 
organization. Madill & O'Reilly (2010) define sponsorship with 
two characteristics: an association and existence of mutual 
benefits in the exchange of resources between sponsors and 
sponsored. Sponsorship can take place in a variety of ways, such 
as through government intervention, development agencies, 
universities, profit and non-profit organizations (Flynn, 1988), 
individuals (Karpoff et al., 1996). 
Sponsors are relevant stakeholders because they have the capacity 
to influence the firm's objectives or to control essential resources 
(Mitchell et al., 1997). Studies on the topic have highlighted the 
influence of sponsors in organizations' governance decisions, 
particularly institutional sponsors, who have greater decision-
making power over individual sponsors (Gillian et al., 2000). In 
addition, we highlight the studies that demonstrate the influence 
of the sponsors in decisions related to the research and 
development of firms (David et al., 2001, Lee & O'Neill, 2003) 
and in decisions about policies and norms of the organizations 
(Galant, 1990; Karpoff et al., 1996). This influence is usually 
effected by acting with the managers of the sponsored 
organization (Karpoff, 2001). 
In this sense, production studies in sponsored free software 
communities point out that community sponsors tend to get 
involved in relevant decisions for software development (Stuemer, 
2009). On the other hand, in non-sponsored communities, 
decisions tend to be more collaborative (Raymond, 1998; 
O'Mahony, 2007), even though this aspect is not consensual 
among authors. For some authors, centralization of decisions is 
also common in non-sponsored communities, with the roles of the 
project manager and core group members being highlighted in the 
decision-making process (Ye & Kishida, 2002; Crowston & 
Houston, 2006; Dafermos, 2012). 
Other relevant aspect also has been considered is the 
formalization of the division of labor in free software 
communities, because it is important to sponsors to establish clear 
rules of division of labor for the investments rationalization. Free 
software communities enable the parallel development of multiple 
versions of the software and the modularization of software into 
specific functionalities (van Wendel de Joode, 2004). In this 
sense, a clearer and more formal definition of the possibilities of 
action and division of labor favors the saving of resources to the 
sponsoring firms, since they allow the targeted allocation to 
versions and modules that favor their interests (Krishnamurthy, 
2003; Henkel, 2006; Wijnen-Meijer & Batenburg, 2007).  
The sponsors have been working with the managers of the 
sponsored organizations in the elaboration of policies and norms, 
in order to guarantee their investments (Galant, 1990, Karpoff et 
al., 1996, Karpoff 2001, Lakhani & Wolf, 2005). In this sense, 
sponsored free software communities have similar characteristics 
to other sponsored organizations, with sponsors intervening to 
establish governance rules (Androutsellis-Theotokis et al., 2010; 
Blekh, 2015). In turn, non-sponsored communities tend to be 
characterized by the bazaar model, described as management 
based on the flexibility and autonomy of the collaborators 
(Raymond, 1999). 
4. METHODOLOGY 
In order to investigate the influence of the sponsors in the 
organizational structures of the free software communities, a 
descriptive research was carried out using secondary data obtained 
from repositories of free software projects, which served as 
complement to semi-structured interviews with members of the 
software communities and employees of the sponsoring 
companies. 
Cases 
The cases have been chosen to illustrate a non-sponsored 
community (GoboLinux) and sponsored communities, one by 
cooperative (Noosfero/Colivre) and by government (Portal 
Modelo/Interlegis). Which one are more than a decade old, 
demonstrating the stability of the community, thus allowing the 
identification of the characteristics of its development and 
organization models (Androutsellis-Theotokis, 2010). Finally, the 
communities were identified as active, demonstrating that 
members continue to collaborate in the functioning of the 
community. In addition, selected communities were started in 
Brazil, one of the countries in which the free software movement 
has gained more relevance due to the number of developers 
involved and the importance of the events carried out 
(Evangelista, 2014). In addition, the Brazilian government has a 
policy for the development and stimulation of the use of free 
software, with emphasis on the Executive Committee on 
Electronic Government (Decree No. 29, 2003) and the Public 
Software Portal, which has more than 60 solutions In Brazil and 
other Latin American countries (Brazil, 2016). 
Categories 
The organizational structures of the software communities 
analyzed in this case study were classified according to analytical 
categories from the review of literature. Table 1 summarizes the 
analytical categories used in this study 
Documentary research 
The data were collected electronically and three secondary 
sources of data were used: the documentation and reports on the 
project, messages sent to the software forum and messages sent to 
the public mailing list. Reading these messages allowed the 
familiarization with the types, quantities, contents and specific 
contributions of each developer, helping to understand the 
dynamics of the functioning of the community studied. This stage 
of the research had the objective to analyze aspects related to the 
influence of the sponsors in the structure of the software 
communities in formal terms manifested in documentation and 
reports.  
Interviews 
The interviews were conducted with a semi-structured guide, 
through direct contact or videoconference. Each interview had an 
approximate duration of 40 minutes and aspects such as the nature 
of the work performed, the sponsor's priority interests, the 
project's history, the conflicts of interest between those involved 
in the project and the nature of the interactions between 
sponsoring organizations and volunteer developers. 
Participants of the interviews were selected from the core group 
participants and members of the free software communities 
whether volunteers, employees or members of the sponsoring 
organizations. The interviews with core group members were 
particularly important because of their influence on the 
organization and structure of the community. The number of 
interviews was determined by the theoretical saturation, that is, 
the point at which new interviews do not aggregate different 
information and categories (Bauer & Gaskell, 2000).  
Procedures for data analysis 
The documents, obtained directly from the documentary research 
and the interview transcripts, were organized by case. Each 
interviewee's speech was analyzed and classified according to the 
potential to elucidate the points referring to the three analytical 
categories of structures described in this research. The classified 
texts were separated and compared for the selection of those that 
best explain the evaluated aspects (Bardin, 1979; Corbin & 
Strauss, 1990). 
5. RESULTS 
On the centralization of decision-making, we found different 
results for sponsored and non-sponsored communities. In 
sponsored communities, there is a clear leadership role played by 
community members who are related to sponsors. This 
characteristic corroborates the observations of Shah (2006), who 
found that the work teams kept by the sponsors tend to define the 
directions that the community should take. 
Colivre is fundamental to the Noosfero community 
because it is a major funder of the project. The main 
developers and current engineers are formed directly or 
indirectly by Colivre (Member of Noosfero's Core 
Group).  
However, community members recognize the leaders' intention to 
keep the decision-making process as decentralized and 
consultative as possible, according to the values of free software 
communities, such as democratic and shared management 
(Raymond, 1999). This characteristic is identified in the 
interviewees 'speech, which recognizes in the representatives of 
the sponsoring entity the interest in receiving and analyzing the 
suggestions that come from the community, strengthening the 
members' motivation and sense of belonging (Hinds & Lee, 
2008).
 
  
Table 1. Analytical Categories and Description. Source: authors. 
Categories Description  Example 
Centralization Centralized: decisions are taken by the top managers (Moch 
& Morse, 1977; Ashmos et al.., 1998; Moynihan & Pandey, 
2005; Lin, 2012). 
Prevalence of decisions made by the sponsor, 
project leader, or community core group. 
 Consultive: the decisions are taken by the top managers with 
validation and contributions from the community. 
Decisions made by the sponsor, project leader 
or community core group, heard from the 
community. 
 Decentralized: decisions are taken predominantly by the 
community (Moch & Morse, 1977; Ashmos et al., 1998; 
Moynihan & Pandey, 2005; Lin, 2012). 
Prevalence of decisions taken by community 
developers 
Division of Labor Departmentalized: the organization presents differentiation, 
observed by the quantity and precision of divisions or 
departments (Hall et al.,1967; Zeffane, 1992; Yang, 2008; 
Mafini, 2014; Gibson et al., 2015). 
Existence of committees, councils, specific 
security teams, release of versions, 
communication, documentation, quality 
management or maintenance. 
 Role segmentation: the organization presents a rudimentary 
form of differentiation, in which some roles are already well 
defined (Ye & Kishida, 2002). 
Presence of project leader, core group, active 
developers, peripheral developers, bug 
reporters, bug fixes, readers, passive users (Ye 
& Kishida, 2002). 
 Undifferentiated: the organization does not show 
differentiation, observed by the quantity and precision of 
divisions or departments (Hall et al.,1967; Zeffane, 1992; 
Yang, 2008; Mafini, 2014; Gibson et al., 2015). 
Voluntary non-systematic or standardized 
development, without organizational 
relationship. 
Formalization Formal-analytic: prevalence of rules, procedures, policies and 
standardizations registered in documents (Yang, 2008; Ho et 
al., 2014). 
Development policies, minutes of decisions, 
social contracts, description of members' roles, 
organization chart, codes of conduct, manuals. 
 Formal-synthetic: prevalence of rules, procedures, policies, 
and standards that are not documented. 
Minimum set of registered procedures and 
policies, such as the Development Policy and 
rules for the establishment of new members in 
the core group. 
 Informal: lack of registration of rules, procedures, policies or 
standards (Yang, 2008; Ho et al., 2014). 
Content of unregistered informal conversations, 
associated with the memory of the members 
who participated in the events and decisions. 
I would not say they are centralizers, they are 
responsible. Communities must have diverse voices, the 
role of leadership is to encourage discussions and make 
decisions that are aligned with the proposed long-term 
vision. (Member of Portal Modelo’s community).  
In turn, in the non-sponsored community, there were signs of 
centralization in the decision-making process. One possible 
explanation for this fact is the small size of the developer group, 
with centralization in the core group being a natural mechanism 
for maintaining mutual trust. In the case under study, the group 
that maintained the community was previously known in a face-
to-face environment, transporting the established relationships in 
an offline environment to the virtual community. 
Regarding the division of labor, sponsored and non-sponsored 
communities presented an initial stage of departmentalization, 
characterized by the segmentation of participants in roles. 
However, it is important to highlight the importance of 
understanding who holds the positions with decision-making 
power in each case. In sponsored communities, it should be noted 
that the role of community coordinator and developers with access 
to the core code was filled by developers contracted by the 
sponsor or institutional partners of the sponsor. In the case of the 
non-sponsored community the role of coordinator was occupied 
by the creator of the application and the positions of developers 
with access to the code were granted to users with more 
contributions to the software code. Therefore, it can be inferred 
that one of the strategies of intervention of the sponsor in the 
structure of the community is the distribution of the decision-
making roles of the community among its contracted employees, 
providing a greater control over the development carried out 
within the community. 
Regarding the formalization of the norms, the projects maintained 
by sponsors differ from the ones not maintained due to the 
formalization of the norms. Although other studies point to 
informality as a feature of free software communities (Henkel 
2006, Sadowski et al., 2008), in this study, sponsored 
communities implemented formal rules and policies. 
Only the new functionalities that are in the roadmap of 
the product will be implemented, according to milestone 
registration. All new functionality proposed by the 
community should be preceded by discussion in the 
respective -dev list of the product and should have its 
insertion previously agreed upon. The insertion can 
happen either through the opening of a new ticket or the 
re-assignment of an existing ticket (Portal Modelo/ 
Interlegis - Development Policy, 2015). 
In opposite, non-sponsored community was characterized as 
informal. This is because community members find it unnecessary 
to formalize standards for a small group of developers. From the 
interviewees' speech, the emergence of norms in free software 
communities is a consequence of the emergence of managerial 
demands, corroborating the position in the literature that 
governance formalization is not an imposition, but rather a 
mechanism that emerges from the shared perception of a need 
(West & O'Mahony, 2005). Particularly, this was clear in the case 
of a sponsored community that established formal norms because 
of new organizational actors into the community.  
This document was a consequence of the approach of 
new agents, besides Colivre, in the project community. 
It was a work done by Colivre with the intention of 
documenting and making feasible the process of entry 
of these new agents in the community, besides defining 
some rules of community functioning, which were 
previously dispersed in the group's own culture, more 
explicitly (Member of Noosfero's Core Group). 
Table 2 summarizes the results obtained for each analytical 
category in the cases studied in this study. 
Table 2. Comparative table of case results. Source: authors. 
Categories  Portal Modelo / Interlegis 
Noosfero / 
Colivre GoboLinux 
Type of 
Sponsor 
 
Sponsored by 
public 
organization 
 
 
Sponsored by 
public cooperative 
 
Non-
sponsored 
Centralization Consultive Consultive Centralized 
Division of 
labor Role segmentation Role segmentation 
Role 
segmentation 
Formalization Formal-Synthetic Formal-Analytic Informal 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
From the researched literature, three analytical categories were 
identified to describe the organizational structure of free software 
communities: centralization, division of labor and formalization. 
Based on these categories, three case studies involving sponsored 
and non-sponsored free software communities were carried out to 
analyze the influence of sponsors in the organizational structures 
of the communities, identifying structural differences between the 
communities and the strategies of the sponsors. 
In the sponsored communities it was evidenced that consultative 
character gives legitimacy to sponsor’s role in the decisions that 
are made within the community. Regards to the division of labor, 
sponsors play a role in defining the key roles of the community, 
which have the power of decision making, and it is essential for 
the community’s organization and achievement of sponsors’ 
objectives. Finally, the sponsors also influence the formalization 
of community norms as a mechanism to clarify roles and work 
flows, legitimizing their interests towards volunteer developers 
and facilitating the negotiation for new organizational 
participants. 
In contrast to the sponsored communities, this study presented the 
case of a non-sponsored free software community which is 
characterized by the centralization of decisions in the group of 
developers. Also, the community was characterized by 
segmentation in roles, and informalization of community norms 
and guidelines. Centralization of decisions and the informalization 
of norms are justified by the small size of the non-sponsored 
community support group. In addition, although the study 
communities have the same approximate time of existence, the 
difference in organization and resources of the sponsored free-
software communities, which are distinguished by the greater 
capacity of management and development, is remarkable. 
For theory, the study presents differential elements between 
sponsored and non-sponsored free software communities, which 
are influenced by the sponsor's performance in their interaction 
with the community. For practical purposes, the study presents 
elements that can be used by organizations that are interested in 
investing in software developed by the free software community, 
which can help these organizations and managers achieve greater 
legitimacy and acceptance in free software communities. 
As future research, we recommend three questions that have 
emerged throughout the research. First, we suggest investigating 
the relationship between sponsorship and the sustainability of 
open source projects. During the research, the role of the 
institutional sponsor for maintenance of open projects was 
becoming increasingly evident. Second, the sharing of structures 
between sponsored organization and sponsor. In our observations, 
these initiatives were consolidated through foundations and 
associating with other institutions to ensure their sustainability. 
Third, another aspect that should be addressed in a research is a 
typology of the types of sponsors of free software communities. 
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